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Abstract Delayed-choice experiments in quantummechanics are often taken
to undermine a realistic interpretation of the quantum state. More specifi-
cally, Healey has recently argued that the phenomenon of delayed-choice
entanglement swapping is incompatible with the view that entanglement is a
physical relation between quantum systems. This paper argues against these
claims. It first reviews two paradigmatic delayed-choice experiments and an-
alyzes their metaphysical implications. It then applies the results of this anal-
ysis to the case of entanglement swapping, showing that such experiments
pose no threat to realism about entanglement.
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1 Introduction
Entangled states of quantum systems have played an important role in de-
bates on the metaphysics of contemporary science. Teller [25], French [8],
Maudlin [15] and Esfeld [6] all base metaphysical claims on the quantum
mechanical description of entangled two-particle states. Glossing over the
substantial differences between these accounts, their general thrust is that
quantum mechanics pushes us away from a metaphysics of individual things
towards a metaphysics of relations, relations which do not supervene on the
intrinsic properties of their relata. Of course, such arguments presuppose that
what appears as the description of an entangled state in the quantum for-
malism actually represents a real relation in the world. This presupposition
derives support from the fact that measurements on entangled states exhibit
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2significant correlations, as demonstrated, for example, in experimental tests
of Bell’s inequality. Furthermore, the flourishing of quantum information the-
ory in the last two decades has resulted in a rather dramatic shift of attitude
towards entanglement: While it was once considered a bizarre consequence
of the quantum formalism with little importance outside of philosophical de-
bates, entanglement has now come to be recognized as a physical resource
which can be experimentally manipulated in various ways.1
In the present paper, I will investigate whether this manipulability re-
ally supports a realist stance on entanglement relations. More specifically,
I will focus on one particular kind of such manipulations, namely entangle-
ment swapping. In this process, two pairs (A,B) and (C,D) of entangled
particles are created by two independent sources. If one then performs the
right kind of joint measurement on particles B and C, the pair (A,D) enters
into an entangled state even though A and D have never interacted with
each other. Interestingly, this phenomenon has given rise to contradicting
ontological conclusions. On the one hand, Rob Clifton [3, p. S163] takes it
to support a realistic view of entanglement: “It appears that there is suffi-
cient substantiality to entanglement that it can be swapped from one pair
of particles to another”. On the other hand, Richard Healey [9] studies an
entanglement-swapping experiment in which the measurement on B and C
is performed after A and D have been detected. Since this seems to imply
that entanglement can be transferred to a pair of particles which no longer
exists, Healey concludes:
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces the
lesson that quantum states are neither descriptions nor representa-
tions of physical reality. In particular, it undermines the idea that as-
cribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way of repre-
senting some new, non-classical, physical relation between them.2 [9,
p. 759]
Obviously, the “delayed-choice” clause plays a central role here. I will therefore
begin my investigation with a brief reminder of the simple and well-known
delayed-choice double-slit experiment, assessing its impact on realism about
the state of the quantum system (section 2). A more sophisticated (and more
radical) version of delayed choice, the so-called quantum eraser, will be dis-
cussed in section 3. The case of the quantum eraser is important because it
introduces the idea of sorting experimental results into different subensem-
bles, thus raising the question whether these subensembles correspond to real
properties of the system. In section 4, I will apply these considerations to the
entanglement-swapping experiment and show that if the experiment is car-
ried out in a delayed-choice setting, no actual entanglement swapping occurs.
1 For an extensive review of this development and the current state of play, see
[12].
2 Healey advances this argument in the context of his pragmatist approach to
quantum theory, which I will not discuss here. Neither will I discuss the positions
of those who take quantum information theory to support an epistemic or infor-
mational (as opposed to metaphysical) view of the quantum state. See [26] for a
critique of these approaches.
3This will, in section 5, lead to the conclusion that delayed-choice entangle-
ment swapping does not undermine realism about entanglement relations.
2 Delayed Choice in the Double-Slit Experiment
The double-slit experiment is probably the best known illustration of the
basic mystery of quantum mechanics. If quantum particles (e.g., electrons in
a sufficiently coherent state) are sent through a double slit, a characteristic
interference pattern appears on the screen behind the two slits. However, this
pattern disappears as soon as one tries to detect through which of the two slits
each electron passed. It thus seems that the electrons either behave as waves
(where “wave behavior” means passing through both slits and producing an
interference pattern) or as particles (where “particle behavior” means passing
only through one slit and displaying no interference), depending on the kind
of experiment we choose to perform. (In the following, I will refer to the two
kinds of experimental arrangements as “DS” (for “double slit”) and “WW”
(for “which way”), respectively.) This is already puzzling enough, but further
puzzlement is added by the insight that the decision to perform either a DS
or a WW experiment can be taken after the electron has passed through the
double slit. It was John A. Wheeler who introduced this idea of a delayed
choice, and he took it to imply that “the past has no existence except as it is
recorded in the present”, and that “[t]he universe does not ‘exist, out there,’
independent of all acts of observation” [28, p. 41].
It is not hard to see how delayed-choice experiments can lead to such anti-
realistic conclusions. If we think of the electron as traveling from the source
to the double slit and then to the screen where it is detected, a natural
question to ask is whether the electron behaved as a wave or as a particle
at the time it traveled through the double slit. (That electrons are disposed
to behave in either of the two ways3 is already known from DS and WW
experiments without delayed choice.) Now if the type of experiment (DS or
WW) is fixed in advance, this determines the behavior of the electron, and a
unique story about its wave- or particle-like nature can be told for each type
of experimental setup. However, in the delayed-choice case, the experiment-
type is not yet fixed at the time the electron is at the double slit, so it seems
that there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether the electron passes
through both slits (as waves do) or through only one slit (as particles do).
It is thus clearly impossible to tell a simple realistic story about what
happens at the double slit in a delayed-choice experiment, if by “realistic”
we mean that the story should attribute a definite, observer-independent
behavior to the electron. More sophisticated realistic stories remain, of course,
possible, but they do not come without a cost. In the next section, I will argue
3 An anonymous referee has reminded me of the fact that there is also a con-
tinuous spectrum of intermediate cases, parametrized by the degree to which WW
information is obtained (see [7, chap. 1] for a classic discussion). This might be seen
as an additional problem for a naive “either-wave-or-particle” view, but I am here
only interested in the specific problems arising from the delayed-choice setting. For
this purpose, it suffices to look at the two extreme cases of a pure DS and a pure
WW experiment.
4for such a story, based on the formalism of standard quantum mechanics. I
will therefore not have much to say about non-standard quantum theories,
such as Bohmian mechanics or the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory.
But I conclude the present section with some brief remarks about these two
theories, in order to illustrate to what extent the delayed-choice double slit
complicates the realist’s ontological commitments.
At first sight, it seems that Bohmian mechanics has a straightforward
answer to the question of what happens at the double slit: Being a parti-
cle theory, Bohmian mechanics clearly tells us that each electron goes only
through one slit. But it also tells us that the movement of the particle is
determined by the wave function, and this raises the tricky question of the
ontological status of the latter. Some versions of the theory interpret the wave
function as a physical entity which literally guides the particles, or they in-
troduce a so-called quantum potential which gives rise to non-classical forces
acting on them. But due to some problems of these interpretations, there is
now a tendency among Bohmians to regard the wave function no longer as
a physical entity, but merely as a component of the law according to which
the particles move [4]. However, in their detailed analysis of delayed-choice
experiments from a Bohmian perspective, Hiley and Callaghan [10] manage
to avoid a commitment to very bizarre particle trajectories only by relying
explicitly on the physical reality of the wave function and the quantum po-
tential, so there is reason to doubt that these entities can really be cut off
from the ontology of Bohmian mechanics without a loss.
An alternative way to tell a realistic story about the double slit is given
by the GRW theory, which adds spontaneous collapses of the wave function
to the Schrödinger evolution. But, as argued by Allori et al. [1] (see also [16,
pp. 229-238]), this theory is also ambiguous in its ontological commitments.
In one version, the wave function describes a matter density in space. Again,
this seems to suggest a straightforward solution to our problem: The matter
density, being a spatially extended field, (almost) always passes through both
slits and collapses to a particle-like object only upon interaction with the
detecting screen. The fact that the experimental setup can be chosen after
the matter wave has passed the double slit then poses no particular problem.
However, according to this story, the result of a WW experiment must be
regarded as outright illusory: Even though it looks as if the electron went
only through one slit (the experiment telling us which one), the fact is that
it went through both. An even more severe illusion takes place according to
the second version of the GRW theory, which is merely committed to the
existence of some events in space-time (the flashes), corresponding to the
spontaneous collapses of the wave function. In this picture, contrary to what
we might take as an unquestionable truth about any double-slit experiment,
nothing at all travels from the source to the screen.
3 The Quantum Eraser
In the experiments discussed so far, the DS/WW decision is taken after the
electron has passed through the double slit, but it obviously has to be taken
5© 1991 Nature Publishing Group
Fig. 1 The quantum eraser thought experiment [23, p. 115].
before the electron is detected. Using a quantum eraser [22], even this restric-
tion can be removed. Consider the thought experiment by Scully et al. [23]
depicted in figure 1: In a double-slit experiment with atoms, we place a mi-
cromaser cavity in front of each slit. The cavities are designed such that
excited atoms passing through them inevitably decay into the ground state
by emitting a photon. So for each atom, the corresponding photon emitted
in one of the cavities provides us with WW information. However, this in-
formation (or more precisely: the possibility of obtaining this information)
can be “erased” by opening the shutters which separate the two cavities from
a thin-film photodetector placed between them. Since this “detector wall”
does not discriminate between photons coming from one or the other cavity,
one can then no longer obtain WW information, and a situation resembling
the original DS configuration is reestablished. So the experimenter has two
options: He can either leave the shutters in place and detect which of the
cavities contains the photon, thereby obtaining WW information, or he can
open the shutters, allowing the photon to interact with the detector wall
without yielding WW information. Note that he can (in principle) decide
between these two options after the atom is detected at the screen.
But one might ask how this can really be a choice between a DS and a
WW scenario, given that the two scenarios should lead to radically different
distributions of atoms on the screen (displaying interference fringes in one
case but not in the other). Surely the pattern on the screen can not be
changed retroactively? Well, in a certain sense, it can. To see how, a closer
look at the quantum mechanical description of the atom-photon-system is
necessary.4 If we denote the photon state by |1〉 or |2〉, depending on whether
4 For the following, I adopt the notation of [5].
6the photon is in cavity 1 or 2, and the spatial wave function of an atom
coming through one of the two slits by ψ1(x) and ψ2(x), respectively, the
state of the system after the atom has passed the slits is
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|1〉ψ1(x) + |2〉ψ2(x)]. (1)
The probability density ‖Ψ(x)‖2 associated with this state has vanishing in-
terference terms, because |1〉 and |2〉 are orthogonal to each other. Therefore,
the distribution of atoms on the screen shows no interference fringes, which
is what we expect for a WW experiment. Now let us see what happens if
the shutters are opened to erase the WW information. As mentioned above,
the detector wall does not discriminate between the |1〉 and the |2〉 state.
However, it does (maximally) discriminate between the symmetric and the
antisymmetric superposition states
|+〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉+ |2〉] and |−〉 = 1√
2
[|1〉 − |2〉].
As a consequence, the detector records only photons in the |+〉 state and
ignores photons in the |−〉 state. Introducing the corresponding symmetric
and antisymmetric states of the atom
ψ±(x) =
1√
2
[ψ1(x)± ψ2(x)],
we can rewrite (1) as
|Ψ〉(x) = 1√
2
[|+〉ψ+(x) + |−〉ψ−(x)]. (2)
Since this is just another way of expressing the same state |Ψ〉(x), the prob-
ability distribution ‖Ψ(x)‖2 is still the one corresponding to the WW setup.
But if we restrict our attention to those atoms for which the photodetector
records a photon, the contribution from |−〉ψ−(x) vanishes and the proba-
bility distribution becomes
P+(x) = |ψ+(x)|2 = 1
2
|ψ1(x) + ψ2(x)|2,
which simply corresponds to the result of a DS experiment, displaying the
usual interference fringes. Conversely, selecting atoms for which the detector
does not record a photon yields P−(x) = |ψ−(x)|2, which corresponds to
the complementary “anti-fringe” interference pattern (see figure 1b). So each
atom can be assigned to one of the four subensembles “1”, “2”, “+” and “−”
in the following way: By measuring the photons in the WW configuration
(shutters closed) we classify the atoms into the subensembles 1 and 2, by
measuring the photons in the DS configuration (shutters open), we carry out
a +/− classification.
To assess the metaphysical significance of delayed choice in this con-
text, we now need to ask to what physical property (if any) the sorting into
subensembles corresponds. Focusing for the moment on subensembles 1 and
72, the answer seems obvious: All atoms in subensemble 1 went through the
first slit, the atoms in subensemble 2 through the second one. Englert et al. [5,
p. 328] endorse this view, but they add an antirealistic twist: “The ‘. . .went
through . . . ’ is not a statement about the atom’s past”. This reinterpretation
of everyday language is motivated by their “minimalistic interpretation” of
the quantum state, which I will not further discuss (see footnote 2 above).
In a closely related proposal, Mohrhoff [19] invokes a kind of retrocausation,
according to which the present determines the past of the atoms. (Notice
the similarity to Wheeler’s above-mentioned view that the past’s existence
depends on its being recorded in the present.) This commitment to retro-
causation renders Mohrhoff’s “reality-of-phenomena point of view” rather
unattractive, but one might be willing to accept this consequence. What
one should not accept is Mohrhoff’s claim that “retrocausation is a neces-
sary feature of any realistic interpretation of the quantum formalism” [19,
p. 332]. He reaches this conclusion by (allegedly) showing that the alternative
“reality-of-states point of view" is not viable.5 Here is his argument:
Adherents to the reality-of-states view thus find themselves faced with
a dilemma. If they . . . deny the possibility of retrocausation, they must
insist that it is only as if the atom had traveled through the first cavity
or only as if it had been retroactively furnished with a definite phase
relation. They cannot say that the atom really was in the state ψ1 (or
ψ2, or ψ+, or ψ−, as the case may be). And so they find themselves
compelled to foreswear realism and embrace operationalism. And if
they stick to realism, they will have to drop the as if ’s and accept the
reality of retrocausation. (ibid.)
But the first thing a reality-of-states view should take seriously is the fact
that |Ψ〉 in (1) and (2) is an entangled state of the atom-photon system, so it
is clear from the start that none of the four (pure) ψ-states can be ascribed
to the atom alone, as long as the system is in state |Ψ〉. It is true that this
commits the realist to Mohrhoff’s as-if -statements (compare my remarks on
the matter-density version of GRW in section 2), but to say that reality dif-
fers from what measurements seem to reveal is very different from saying (as
the operationalist would) that there is no reality beyond measurements. The
second thing a reality-of-states view should take seriously is state reduction.
After a measurement on one of the two particles, the formalism of standard
quantum mechanics6 no longer describes the atom-photon system by |Ψ〉,
5 I should mention that Mohrhoff has earlier defended a “reality-of-states point
of view” himself [18]. Therefore, I cannot claim originality for much of what I will
have to say in the rest of this section. In response to criticism by Englert et al.
[5], Mohrhoff later abandoned this view in favor of a “reality-of-phenomena point
of view”, which may be seen as a kind of compromise between the minimalistic
interpretation advocated by Englert et al. and realism about the quantum state.
The details of this debate do not matter here, because I am not attempting to
evaluate the final positions of either of the two parties, but am only concerned
with the claim that quantum state realism is not viable, a claim which seems to be
common ground between Englert et al. and Mohrhoff’s more recent paper.
6 As is well known, there is no satisfying characterization of “measurement”
within standard quantum mechanics [2]. The reality-of-states view presented here
is compatible with different solutions to this problem, e.g., the GRW theory or an
8but by a separable state. A realistic view of the quantum state suggests that
this change of description corresponds to a real physical change. This implies
that the metaphysical significance of the sorting of atoms into subensembles
depends on the temporal ordering of the measurements.7 If the photon is
measured prior to the atom’s arrival at the screen, the subensembles corre-
spond to real properties, because the photon measurement brings about the
state reduction
|Ψ〉(x)→ |i〉ψi(x), i ∈ {1, 2,+,−}, (3)
so that each atom actually is in one of the ψi states prior to its hitting the
screen. But if the time order of the two measurements is reversed, the atom
never is in any one of these states, because (3) does not occur. Instead, the
atom’s arrival at the screen (at a location x0) results in a state reduction of
the form
|Ψ〉(x)→ [α|1〉+ β|2〉]φx0(x), (4)
where φx0(x) is a spatial wave function well localized at x0.8 In this case,
assigning the atom to a subensemble depending on the result of the photon
measurement implies nothing about the physical state of the atom, whether
past or present.9
Everett-type approach. In the latter case, state reduction is to be understood as
a branching of worlds due to environment-induced decoherence. Some additional
remarks on how this plays out in the experiments discussed here will be given in
footnotes 9 and 13.
7 This becomes problematic in a relativistic context, where the temporal ordering
of spacelike separated events depends on the reference frame. The question of how
to reconcile quantum non-locality with relativity is beyond the scope of this paper
(see [16] for an insightful discussion). But since an anonymous referee has pressed
me on this point, I offer the following justification for assuming a well-defined
temporal ordering between any two events: Some of the most widely discussed
realistic versions of quantum theory (e.g., Bohmian mechanics and the matter-
density version of GRW) involve a commitment to a preferred foliation of spacetime.
If these proposals are reasonable, then so is the assumption that there is a definite
(although undetectable) temporal ordering between any two events.
8 For details about the coefficients α and β, see [5, eq. 8]. Of course, we could
equally well express the photon state in the |+〉, |−〉 basis.
9 Although I have derived this result within a view that takes state reductions
as real events, it is interesting to note that the result is not peculiar to such a view.
Hiley and Callaghan [11] analyze the situation from a Bohmian perspective, which
does not regard state reductions as real, but instead assigns a definite trajectory
to each atom. Their conclusion is analogous to mine, namely that the retrospective
sorting into subensembles does not correspond to differences in the trajectories of
the atoms.
From an Everettian perspective, there is a sense in which the subensembles never
have any metaphysical significance: Strictly speaking, according to Everettian quan-
tum mechanics, superpositions never disappear, hence if the atom started out as
part of an entangled system, it never enters into one of the ψi states. But in that
sense, no experience ever has metaphysical significance, because our experiences
keep telling us that the world around us is in some unique, non-superposed state,
while it really is not. Everettians usually prefer a less drastic formulation, accord-
ing to which our experience is not so much illusory as merely incomplete: The
macroscopic world we experience then counts as perfectly real, but it is only one
branch among infinitely many others which we do not experience. With such a
branch-relative notion of reality in place, the metaphysical significance of the mea-
surement subensembles can be assessed in exactly the same way as in a theory with
9But then, isn’t the appearance of definite (WW or DS) patterns within the
subensembles somewhat miraculous? I do not think so. Given that the atom
and the photon formed an entangled system up to the moment of the atom’s
detection, it is not so surprising that we can obtain interesting patterns by
correlating the location of the atom’s detection with the result of a posterior
photon measurement. But this correlating is something the experimenter
needs to do; the correlation is no longer “there”, once the transition (4) has
occurred.
4 Delayed-Choice Entanglement Swapping
We can now apply the foregoing considerations to the process of entangle-
ment swapping, first proposed by Yurke and Stoler [29] (see also [30]). In the
simplest case, this involves entangled pairs of two-state systems, which can
be conveniently described by introducing the four so-called Bell states:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉].
Now consider two independent sources, each one emitting a particle pair in
the state |ψ−〉. Denoting the two pairs by (A,B) and (C,D) respectively, the
state of the complete system is given by
|Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉AB |ψ−〉CD. (5)
This is obviously a separable state, reflecting the fact that the two pairs are
mutually independent. But now suppose that particles B and C are sent to
the same location, where a Bell measurement is performed on them, such
that their joint state is projected onto one of the four Bell states |ψ±〉BC ,
|φ±〉BC .10 To see how this affects particles A and D, we rewrite equation (5)
by expressing |Ψ〉 in the basis given by the Bell states of the pairs (A,D) and
(B,C):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉AD|ψ+〉BC − |ψ−〉AD|ψ−〉BC − |φ+〉AD|φ+〉BC + |φ−〉AD|φ−〉BC] .
(6)
Since the Bell states are orthogonal to each other, the Bell measurement on
the (B,C) pair projects the state |Ψ〉 onto an entangled state of the (A,D)
pair, for example:
〈ψ+|BC |Ψ〉 = 1
2
|ψ+〉AD,
state reduction. If the photon is measured first, branching occurs (due to decoher-
ence), and within each branch, the atom really (in the branch-relative sense) enters
into one of the ψi states. By contrast, if the measurement of the photon is delayed,
the atom never is in such a state (not even in the branch-relative sense), because
no branching occurs until the atom hits the screen.
10 This is an idealized description. In practice, a Bell measurement is unable to
identify all of the four Bell states. For technical reasons, experiments usually focus
on the singlet state |ψ−〉 [20,13].
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and analogously for the other Bell states. Thus particles A and D emerge as
an entangled pair, although they never interacted with each other.11
As Asher Peres [21] points out, this procedure can be carried out in a
delayed-choice mode, such that the decision to perform a Bell measurement
on the (B,C) pair may take place after any measurements on the (A,D)
pair.12 But since particles A and D only become entangled with each other if
the (B,C) measurement is actually performed, it seems that “entanglement
is produced a posteriori, after the entangled particles have been measured
and may no longer exist” [21, p. 139]. We have seen in the introduction
that Healey takes this to undermine the idea that entanglement is a physical
relation. To support his view, he offers the following reductio ad absurdum:
To hold onto that idea in the context of this experiment would re-
quire one to maintain not only that which entanglement relation ob-
tains between a pair of photons at some time, but also whether any
such relation then obtains between them, depends on what happens
to other independent systems later, after the pair has been absorbed
into the environment. [9, p. 759]
There is a clear parallel between this argument and the discussion in section
3, and this might seem to force me into accepting Healey’s conclusion. In
section 3, my unwillingness to accept retrocausation led me to reject the
claim that the atom really went through either one of the slits (even if a
WW measurement seems to tell us so). Should it then not also lead me
to reject the claim that the (A,D) pair really either was or was not in an
entangled state prior to the (B,C) measurement? But such an indefiniteness
seems incompatible with the view that entanglement relations are real. This
result would be particularly troubling in view of the fact that the notion of
an entangled state played a crucial role in the account I defended in section
3.
Yet, a closer look reveals that the parallels between the two cases do not
threaten realism about entanglement. Rather, they can be exploited to re-
fute Healey’s argument. In section 3, I showed that a delayed measurement
of the photon results in a sorting of atoms into subensembles which do not
correspond to any physical properties of the atoms. Precisely the same thing
can happen in entanglement swapping: The Bell measurement on the (B,C)
pair allows us to sort the (A,D) pairs into four subensembles corresponding
to the four Bell states. Without delayed choice, this has physical significance,
because each (A,D) pair really is in such a state after the (B,C) measure-
ment.13 But if the (A,D) measurements precede the (B,C) measurement,
the (A,D) pair never is in any of these states. This is entirely compati-
ble with the fact that evaluating the (A,D) measurements within a certain
11 It has been argued [24] that the phenomenon of entanglement swapping by itself
(even without adding the delayed-choice condition with which I will be concerned
in the following) calls into question the “ontological robustness” of entanglement.
See [27] for a response to this kind of argument.
12 The proposal has recently been experimentally realized [14].
13 In an Everettian context, “really” here again has to be understood in a branch-
relative sense. Analogously to the situation described in footnote 9, the important
contrast is that in the delayed-choice case, the (A,D) pair never (not even in a
branch-relative sense) is in a pure state.
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subensemble shows Bell-type correlations, just as the subensembles in section
3 showed interference or WW patterns.
Therefore, far from being committed to any indeterminacy about entan-
glement (or any backward-in-time influences), a realistic view of the quantum
state yields a perfectly clear assessment of what happens in entanglement
swapping: If the (B,C) measurement occurs at a time the complete system
is still in state |Ψ〉, it confers entanglement on the (A,D) pair, if it occurs at
a later time, it does not.14
5 Conclusion
I have argued that delayed-choice experiments do not undermine a realistic
view of the quantum state. In the case of the double slit, we saw that they
merely undermine a simplistic realism which unreflectively identifies the re-
sult of a WW experiment with a statement about which slit the particle went
through. The quantum eraser and the case of delayed-choice entanglement
swapping required a more careful treatment, because one needs to get clear
about the metaphysical significance of the subensembles appearing in these
experiments. Once this is achieved, a straightforward reality-of-states story
can be told for these seemingly troubling cases.
This does, of course, not exclude non-realism about the quantum state.
But it seems to me that the empirical success of quantum mechanics gives
us at least some prima facie reason to view quantum states as describing an
independent reality. The non-realist then needs an argument for the claim
that this is a mistake. Wheeler, Englert et al., Mohrhoff and Healey all think
that delayed-choice experiments furnish such an argument. This I have shown
not to be the case.
The same dialectic applies, more specifically, to the metaphysics of en-
tanglement. The various things physicists can do with entanglement support
the intuition that there must be some reality to it. Against this, Healey ar-
gues that delayed-choice entanglement swapping implies an indeterminacy
of entanglement which is incompatible with realism. Having shown that the
realist can avoid such an indeterminacy, I conclude that we can, until further
notice, consider entanglement as a real relation.
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14 At the time of revising this article, Megidish et al. [17] reported a rather spec-
tacular variant of a delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment, in which
the photons A and D not only never interact, but never even coexist. My analysis
straightforwardly applies to this case as well: Since the complete system is not in
state |Ψ〉 at the time the (B,C) measurement occurs (in fact, there is no four-
particle system at any time in this experiment), no actual entanglement swapping
takes place.
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